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Abstract. Can there be higher level laws of nature even though everything is re-
ducible to the fundamental laws of physics? The computer science notion of level 
of abstraction explains how there can be. The key relationship between elements 
on different levels of abstraction is not the is-composed-of relationship but the im-
plements relationship. I take a scientific realist position with respect to (material) 
levels of abstraction and their instantiation as (material) entities. They exist as ob-
jective elements of nature. Reducing them away to lower order phenomena pro-
duces a reductionist blind spot and is bad science.  
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1. Introduction 
When a male Emperor penguin stands for two frigid months balancing an egg on 
its feet to keep it from freezing, are we to understand that behavior in terms of 
quarks and other fundamental particles? It seems unreasonable, but that‟s the re-
ductionist position. Here‟s how Albert Einstein [1] put it.  
The painter, the poet, the speculative philosopher, and the natural scientist … each in his 
own fashion, tries to make for himself .. a simplified and intelligible picture of the world. 
What place does the theoretical physicist's picture of the world occupy among these? … 
In regard to his subject matter … the physicist … must content himself with describing 
the most simple events which can be brought within the domain of our experience … . 
But what can be the attraction of getting to know such a tiny section of nature thoroughly, 
while one leaves everything subtler and more complex shyly and timidly alone? Does the 
product of such a modest effort deserve to be called by the proud name of a theory of the 
universe?  
In my belief the name is justified; for the general laws on which the structure of 
theoretical physics is based claim to be valid for any natural phenomenon whatsoever. 
With them, it ought to be possible to arrive at … the  theory of every natural process, 
including life, by means of pure deduction.  …  The supreme task of the physicist is to 
arrive at those elementary universal laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure 
deduction. [emphasis added] 
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The italicized portion expresses what Anderson [2] calls (and rejects) the con-
structionist hypothesis: the idea that one can start with physics and reconstruct the 
universe. 
More recently Steven Weinberg [3] restated Einstein‟s position as follows.  
Grand reductionism is … the view that all of nature is the way it is … because of simple 
universal laws, to which all other scientific laws may in some sense be reduced. …  
Every field of science operates by formulating and testing generalizations that are 
sometimes dignified by being called principles or laws. … But there are no principles of 
chemistry that simply stand on their own, without needing to be explained reductively 
from the properties of electrons and atomic nuclei, and … there are no principles of 
psychology that are free-standing, in the sense that they do not need ultimately to be 
understood through the study of the human brain, which in turn must ultimately be 
understood on the basis of physics and chemistry. 
Not all physicists agree with Einstein and Weinberg. As Erwin Schrödinger [4] 
wrote,  
[L]iving matter, while not eluding the 'laws of physics' … is likely to involve 'other laws,' 
[which] will form just as integral a part of [its] science. 
In arguing against the constructionist hypothesis Anderson [2] extended 
Schrödinger‟s thought. 
[T]he ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws … [does not imply] the 
ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe. …  
At each level of complexity entirely new properties appear. … [O]ne may array the 
sciences roughly linearly in [a] hierarchy [in which] the elementary entities of [the 
science at level n+1] obey the laws of [the science at level n]: elementary particle physics, 
solid state (or many body) physics, chemistry, molecular biology, cell biology, …, 
psychology, social sciences. But this hierarchy does not imply that science [n+1] is „just 
applied [science n].‟ At each [level] entirely new laws, concepts, and generalization are 
necessary. 
Notwithstanding their disagreements, all four physicists (and of course many 
others) agree that everything can be reduced to the fundamental laws of physics. 
Here‟s how Anderson put it. 
[The] workings of all the animate and inanimate matter of which we have any detailed 
knowledge are … controlled by the … fundamental laws [of physics]. … [W]e must all 
start with reductionism, which I fully accept.  
Einstein and Weinberg argue that that‟s the end of the story. Starting with the 
laws of physics and with sufficiently powerful deductive machinery one should be 
able to reconstruct the universe. Schrödinger and Anderson disagree. They say 
that there‟s more to nature than the laws of physics—but they were unable to say 
what that might be. 
Before going on, you may want to answer the question for yourself. Do you 
agree with Einstein and Weinberg or with Schrödinger and Anderson? Is there 
more than physics—and if so, what is it? 
Note: I’d like 
this paragraph 
(“Before going 
on …”) to be set 
off by extra 
white space be-
fore and after 
or in some oth-
er way. Thanks. 
3 
 3/30/2009 
The title and abstract of this paper give away my position. I agree with 
Schrödinger and Anderson. My position is that the computer science notion of 
level of abstraction explains how there can be higher level laws of nature—even 
though everything is reducible to the fundamental laws of physics. The basic idea 
is that a level of abstraction has both a specification and an implementation. The 
implementation is a reduction of the specification to lower level functionality. But 
the specification is independent of the implementation. So even though a level of 
abstraction depends on lower level phenomena for its realization it cannot be re-
duced to that implementation without losing something important, namely the 
properties that derive from its specification.  
2. Levels of abstraction 
A level of abstraction (Guttag [5]) is (a) a collection of types (which for the most 
part means categories) and (b) operations that may be applied to entities of those 
types. A standard example is the stack, which is defined by the following opera-
tions.  
push(stack: s, element: e)    — Push an element e into a stack s and return the stack. 
pop(stack: s)   — Pop the top element off the stack s and return the stack. 
top(stack: s)    — Return (but don't pop) the top element of a stack s. 
Although the intuitive descriptions are important for us as readers, all we have 
done so far is to declare a number of operations. How are their meanings defined? 
Axiomatically.  
top(push(stack: s, element: e)) = e.    
  — After e is pushed onto a stack, its top element is e. 
pop(push(stack: s, element: e) = s.     
  — After pushing e onto s and then popping it off, s is as it was. 
Together, these declarations and axioms define a stack as anything to which the 
operations can be applied while satisfying the axioms.  
This is similar to how mathematics is axiomatized. Consider the non-negative 
integers as specified by Peano‟s axioms.1  
1. Zero is a number. 
2. If A is a number, the successor of A is a number. 
3. Zero is not the successor of a number. 
4. Two numbers of which the successors are equal are themselves equal. 
                                                          
1 As given in Wolfram‟s MathWorld: http://mathworld.wolfram.com/PeanosAxioms.html.  
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5. (Induction axiom) If a set S of numbers contains zero and also the successor 
of every number in S, then every number is in S.  
These axioms specify the terms zero, number, and successor. Here number is a 
type, Zero is an entity of that type, and successor is an operation on numbers. 
These terms stand on their own and mean (formally) no more or less than the defi-
nitions say they mean.  
Notice that in neither of these definitions were the new terms defined in terms 
of pre-existing terms. Neither a number nor a stack is defined as a special kind of 
something else. Both Peano‟s axioms and the stack definition define terms by es-
tablishing relationships among them. The terms themselves, stack and a number, 
are defined ab initio and solely in terms of operations and relationships among 
those operations. 
This is characteristic of levels of abstraction. When specifying a level of ab-
straction the types, objects, operations, and relationships at that level stand on 
their own. They are not defined in terms of lower level types, objects, operations, 
and relationships. 
See the sidebar on how levels of abstraction function in different disciplines. 
3. Unsolvability and the Game of Life 
The Game of Life2 is a 2-dimensional cellular automaton in which cells are either 
alive (on) or dead (off). Cells turn on or off synchronously in discrete time steps 
according to rules that specify cell behavior as a function of their eight neighbors.  
 Any cell with exactly three live neighbors will stay alive or become alive.  
 Any live cell with exactly two live neighbors will stay alive.  
 All other cells die.  
The preceding rules are to the Game-of-Life world as the fundamental laws of 
physics are to ours. They determine everything that happens on a Game-of-Life 
grid.  
Certain on-off cell configurations create patterns—or really sequences of pat-
terns. The glider is the best known. When a glider is entered onto an empty grid 
and the rules applied, a series of patterns propagates across the grid. Since nothing 
actually moves in the Game of Life—the concept of motion doesn‟t even exist—
how should we understand this?  
                                                          
2 An accessible popular discussion of the Game of Life is available in Poundstone  
[6]. 
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Gliders exist on a different level of abstraction from that of the Game of Life. 
At the Game-of-Life level there is nothing but grid cells—in fixed positions. But 
at the glider level not only do gliders move, one can even write equations for the 
number of time steps it will take a glider to move from one location to another. 
What is the status of such glider velocity equations?  
Before answering that question, recall that it‟s possible to implement Turing 
machines by arranging gliders and other Game-of-Life patterns. Just as gliders are 
subject to the laws of glider equations, Turing machines too are subject to their 
own laws—in particular, computability theory.   
Game-of-Life gliders and Turing machines exemplify the situation described 
by Schrödinger. They are phenomena that appear on a Game-of-Life grid but are 
governed by laws that apply on a different and independent level of abstraction. 
While not eluding the Game-of-Life rules, autonomous new laws apply to them. 
These additional laws are not expressible in Game-of-Life terms. There is no such 
thing as a glider or a Turing machine at the Game-of-Life level. The Game of Life 
is nothing but a grid of cells along with rules that determine when cells go on and 
off. In other words, Game-of-Life gliders and Game-of-Life Turing machines 
(a) are governed by laws that are independent of the Game of Life rules while at 
the same time they (b) are completely determined by the Game of Life rules. 
4. Evolution is also a property of a level of abstraction 
Evolution offers another example of how levels of abstraction give rise to new 
laws. Evolution is an abstract process that can be described as follows.  
Evolution occurs in the context of a population of entities. The entities exist in 
an environment within which they may survive and reproduce. The entities have 
properties that affect how they interact with their environment. Those interactions 
help determine whether the entities will survive and reproduce. When an entity 
reproduces, it produces offspring which inherit its properties, possibly along with 
some random variations, which may result in new properties. In some cases, pairs 
of entities reproduce jointly, in which case the offspring inherit some combination 
of their parent‟s properties—perhaps also with random variations.  
The more likely an entity is to survive and reproduce, the more likely it is that 
the properties that enabled it to survive and reproduce will be passed on to its 
offspring. If certain properties—or random variations of those properties, or the 
random creation of new properties—enable their possessors to survive and repro-
duce more effectively, those properties will propagate.  
We call the generation and propagation of successful properties evolution. By 
helping to determine which entities are more likely to survive and reproduce, the 
6  
3/30/2009 
environment selects the properties to be propagated—hence evolution by envi-
ronmental (i.e., natural) selection.  
The preceding description introduced a number of terms (in italics). As in the 
case of stacks and Peano numbers, the new terms are defined ab initio at the evo-
lution level of abstraction. The independent usefulness of evolution as a level of 
abstraction is illustrated by evolutionary computation, which uses the abstract evo-
lutionary mechanism to solve difficult optimization problems. It does so in a way 
that has nothing to do with biology or natural environments. 
5. The reductionist blind spot 
Physics recognizes four fundamental forces. Evolution is not one of them. Similar-
ly there is no computational functionality in a Game-of-Life universe. In other 
words, both evolution and Turing machine computation appear as phenomena 
within frameworks that are blind to their existence. Nevertheless, both evolution 
and Turing machine computation can be completely explained in terms of pheno-
mena that operate as primitives within those frameworks. Given that, do we really 
need concepts such as evolution and Turing machine computation?  
In some sense we don‟t. Echoing Kim [7], Schouten and de Jong [8] put it this 
way.  
If a higher level explanation can be related to physical processes, it becomes redundant 
since the explanatory work can be done by physics. 
In this sense both evolution and computations done by Game-of-Life Turing 
machines are redundant. After all, Game-of-Life Turing machines as such don‟t 
do anything. It is only the Game-of-Life rules that make cells go on and off. Re-
ductionism has not been overthrown. One could trace the sequence of Game-of-
Life rule applications that transform an initial Game-of-Life configuration (that 
could be described as a Turing machine with input x) into a final configuration 
(that could be described as a Turing machine with output y). One could do this 
with no mention of Turing machines. 
Similarly one could presumably—albeit with great difficulty—trace the se-
quence of chemical and physical reactions and interactions that produce a particu-
lar chemical configuration (that could be described as the DNA that enables its 
possessor to thrive in its environment). One could do this with no mention of 
genes, codons, proteins, or other evolutionary or biological terms. 
One can always reduce away macro-level terminology and associated physical 
phenomena and replace them with the underlying micro-level terminology and as-
sociated physical phenomena. It is still the elementary mechanisms—and nothing 
but those mechanisms—that turn the causal crank. So why not reduce away higher 
levels of abstraction? 
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Reducing away a level of abstraction produces a reductionist blind spot. Com-
putations performed by Game-of-Life Turing machines cannot be described as 
computations when one is limited to the vocabulary of the Game-of-Life. Nor can 
one explain why the Game of Life halting problem is unsolvable. These concepts 
exist only at the Turing machine level of abstraction. Similarly, biological evolu-
tion cannot be explicated at the level of physics and chemistry. The evolutionary 
process exists only at the evolution level of abstraction. It is only entities at that 
level of abstraction that evolve. 
Furthermore, reducing away a level of abstraction throws away elements of na-
ture that have objective existence. At each level of abstraction there are entities 
(see Section 10)—such as Turing machines and biological organisms—that instan-
tiate types at that level. These entities are simultaneously causally reducible and 
ontologically real—a formulation coined by Searle [9] in another context. Entities 
on a level of abstraction that are implemented by a lower level of abstraction are 
causally reducible because the implementation provides the forces and mechan-
isms that drive them. But such entities are ontologically real because (a) their spe-
cifications, which are independent of their implementations, characterize what 
they do and how they behave and (b) they are objectively observable, i.e., observ-
able independently of human conceptualization as a result (i) of their reduced en-
tropy and (ii) of their mass distinctions. Again, see Section 10 for additional dis-
cussion of entities. 
The goal of science is to understand nature. Reducing away levels of abstrac-
tion discards both real scientific explanations—such as the evolutionary mechan-
ism—and objectively real entities—such as biological organisms. Denying the ex-
istence of biological organisms as entities requires that one also throw away 
biological taxonomic categories such as species, or phyla, or even kingdoms. 
What are such categories after all if there are no such things as biological entities 
for them to collect? But do we really want to dismiss the grand taxonomy of life—
with a place for all life forms from E. coli to elephants—whose structure and his-
tory biology has been so successful in describing? What would be left of biology? 
Not much. Reducing away levels of abstraction and the entities associated with 
them is simply bad science. 
Reducing away levels of abstraction is bad science from an information theo-
retic perspective as well. Chaitin [10] points out that Leibniz anticipated algorith-
mic information theory when he characterized science as developing the simplest 
hypothesis (in the algorithmic information theory sense) for the richest phenome-
na. Throwing away a level of abstraction typically increases the algorithmic com-
plexity of a description of some phenomenon.3 
                                                          
3 Dennett [11] makes a similar observation. See the Appendix for an extended dis-
cussion of that article. 
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6. Constructionism and the principle of ontological emergence 
Game-of-Life Turing machines and biological evolution illustrate Schrödinger‟s 
insight that although higher level phenomena don‟t elude the laws of physics they 
are governed by new laws. Because the higher level laws are not derived from the 
laws governing the implementing level, knowledge of the lower level laws does 
not enable one to generate a specification and implementation of the higher level. 
That is, one would not expect to be able to deduce computability theory from 
knowledge of the Game-of-Life rules, and one would not expect to be able to de-
duce biological evolution from knowledge of fundamental physics. As Anderson 
argued—and contrary to Einstein—constructionism fails. No matter how much 
deductive power one has available, one should not expect to start with the funda-
mental laws of physics and reconstruct all of nature.  
In some ways the preceding statement is a bit of an exaggeration. Computabili-
ty theory, after all, can be derived from first principles. Since the rules of the 
Game of Life are not incompatible with the theory of computability, throwing 
them in as extra premises doesn‟t prevent that derivation.  
The point is that higher level abstractions are typically creative additions to 
lower levels. The notion that one could start with lower level elements and deduce 
higher level elements is similar to the notion that one could start with a mountain 
of granite and deduce the faces of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt. 
The granite can be carved and molded into those faces. But given the intuitive in-
terpretation of deduce it makes little sense to say that one could start with the gra-
nite and deduce the faces. The idea of carving those faces into the granite was a 
creative leap, not what would normally be considered a deduction. 
Even with this in mind, though, constructionism can be said to succeed. It has 
taken billions of years, but nature has implemented biological organisms. And the 
faces of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt, are on Mt. Rushmore. 
Nature accomplished this trick starting from quantum mechanics. So if one con-
siders nature as a mechanism for generating and implementing new levels of ab-
straction, then nature embodies constructionism.  
Nature does its work as a random enumerator of possibilities—and not in the 
deductive/explanatory sense suggested by Einstein and Weinberg. Nature is both 
creative in the sense of Dennett [12] and constructive. Normally one doesn‟t refer 
to nature‟s processes as deductive. But just as software theorem provers work by 
searching the space of possible proofs until they find one that works, nature too 
proceeds by search, retaining levels of abstraction that work and discarding those 
that don‟t.  If software theorem provers are deductive, then so is nature.  
Nature is continually generating new levels of abstractions. Which persist? It 
depends on the environment at the time. Molecules persist only in environments 
with low enough temperatures; biological organisms persist only in environments 
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that provide nourishment; and hurricanes (the only non-biological and non-social 
dynamic entity of which I‟m aware) persist only in environments with a supply of 
warm water. This can be summarized as the principle of ontological emergence.  
Extant levels of abstraction are those whose implementations have materialized 
and whose environments enable their persistence.4  
It‟s important to realize, though, that in generating new levels of abstraction na-
ture does not build strictly layered hierarchies. New entity types may interact with 
any existing entity type. The levels are not partitioned into disjoint layers that inte-
ract only hierarchically. This is nicely illustrated by the fact that the gecko, a very 
macro organism, makes direct use (Kellar [14]) of the quantum level van der 
Vaals force to cling to vertical surfaces.  
7. Constraints, predictions, and downward entailment 
Higher level laws generally have lower level implications. Because the halting 
problem is unsolvable, for example, it is unsolvable whether an arbitrary Game-
of-Life configuration will ever reach a stable state. And because the Game of Life 
can implement a Turing machine, the Game of Life can compute any computable 
function. In other words, computability theory, a law that applies to a Game-of-
Life Turing machine, has consequences for the Game of Life itself. Similarly, ve-
locity equations for Game-of-Life gliders can be used to predict when a glider will 
“turn on” a particular cell.  
A similar phenomenon illustrates how the abstract theory of evolution predicts 
DNA—or something like it. When Darwin and Wallace described the evolution 
level of abstraction, they knew nothing about DNA. But their model required 
some mechanism for recording and transmitting properties. In other words, their 
model made a prediction that any implementation of the evolution level of abstrac-
tion must provide a mechanism for transmitting properties from parents to 
offspring. Because biology implements the evolutionary level of abstraction one 
                                                          
4 I treat levels of abstraction—and their instantiations as entities—as real elements 
of nature. This contrasts with the position taken by Floridi [13], which treats levels 
of abstraction as epistemological. The focus of Floridi‟s work is to understand ob-
servable data in terms of typed variables, which in turn are organized as levels of 
abstraction. As Floridi writes in his conclusion,  
I have shown how … analysis … may be conducted at different levels of epistemological 
abstraction without assuming any corresponding ontological levelism. Nature does not 
know about [Levels of Abstraction] …. 
My position is that not only does nature know about levels of abstraction, they are 
fundamental to how nature builds the richness we see around us. 
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can conclude that biological organisms must have such a means to transmit prop-
erties. We now know that DNA is that mechanism. Prediction confirmed.  
When autonomous higher level laws apparently affect lower level phenomena 
the result has been called (Andersen [15]) downward causation. But downward 
causation doesn‟t make scientific sense. It is always the lower level phenomena 
that determine the higher level. The Game-of-Life rules, not glider equations, are 
the only things that determine when and whether cells go on and off.  
But if causation is always upwards, how can computability theory and glider 
equations let us draw conclusions about Game-of-Life cells? How can evolution 
let us draw conclusion about biological organisms? In [16] I call this downward 
entailment. Autonomous laws that apply at a higher level of abstractions can have 
implications for elements at a lower level as long as the lower level is implement-
ing the higher level.  
When frozen into ice cubes, for example, H2O molecules form a rigid lattice 
and are constrained to travel together whenever the ice cube that they implement 
is moved about. This is only common sense. As long as molecules of H2O are im-
plementing a solid, they are constrained by laws that govern solids. Once the ice 
cube melts and the H2O molecules are no longer implementing a solid, they are no 
longer bound by the laws of solids. This clarifies the somewhat mystical-sounding 
position taken by Sperry [17] when discussing how it is that the atoms and mole-
cules that make up a wheel move in such a coordinated way.  
The fate of the entire population of atoms, molecules, and other components [that 
constitute a wheel rolling downhill] are determined very largely by the holistic properties 
of the whole wheel as a unit. 
In these examples, constraints play a primary role. They may be seen to be op-
erating in two directions. First, the lower level system is constrained so that it im-
plements some higher level abstractions. The Game of Life is constrained to be-
have like a Turing machine; water molecules are constrained to behave as a solid; 
granite is constrained to form the features of four American presidents.  
Once those constraints are in place, the properties of the higher level objects 
constrain the implementing components. This second sort of constraint may be 
misleading if it suggests downward causation. There is no downward causation. 
But the properties and behaviors of the higher level object necessitate properties or 
behaviors of the lower level elements that implement them. As long as the lower 
level continues to implement the upper level the lower level is necessarily con-
strained by whatever constraints apply at the upper level. 
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8. The fundamental relationship between levels of abstraction  
Putnam [18] makes a similar argument. He asks how one should explain why a 
square peg won‟t fit into a round hole whose diameter is the same length as the 
peg‟s side. Should the explanation be based on quantum physics or on geometry? 
Putnam‟s answer is that the explanation should be based on geometry.  
An explanation at the level of quantum physics explains only the one particular 
peg-and-hole pair under consideration whereas one based on geometry explains all 
peg-and-hole pairs of incompatible dimensions. Putnam argues in particular that 
the quantum-level explanation must consider the particular elementary particles 
(and hence the materials) of which the peg and hole are made. But the particular 
particles and materials are not (or should not be) relevant—as long as they imple-
ment non-deformable materials; only the relative dimensions of the peg and hole 
matter. Thus the geometrical explanation is superior.  
When considering the peg-and-hole question, one of the fundamental issues 
concerns the language and concepts one should allow oneself to use. At the quan-
tum level, there is no such thing as a peg. So how can one even begin to approach 
the question? A peg can only be laboriously constructed by describing how it is 
constructed from elementary particles. But if one then makes an argument based 
on the geometry of the constructed peg is one not still using the argument from 
geometry rather than the argument from quantum physics? The argument from 
quantum physics would have to focus on the individual particles in the peg and the 
hole. But in doing that, one would have lost track of the peg and hole as geome-
trical entities—which are the subject matter of the original question.  
The fundamental relationship between levels of abstraction is the implementation 
relation: one level implements another. An argument that describes how a peg and 
hole may be implemented from quantum phenomena and then claims based on the 
geometry of the resulting peg and hole that one cannot be inserted into the other is 
really making an argument at the geometric level. The only role that the quantum 
level plays is to show that it is possible to implement pegs and holes using quan-
tum phenomena. 
On the other hand, if one does not construct a peg and a hole from quantum 
phenomena but simply shows that a particular configuration of elementary par-
ticles (that we would describe as a peg) and another configuration of elementary 
particles (that we would describe as a hole) cannot be manipulated so that they 
would fit the description that we would call having the peg inside the hole, then 
one must make that argument for every configuration of elementary particles that 
one wishes to cover. Even then, it isn‟t clear how one could claim that one has 
said anything about pegs and holes in general or that one could even define the 
terms peg and hole.  
12  
3/30/2009 
One might approach the problem from a different direction. Since at the quan-
tum level one can make use of spatial language, one can define peg and hole 
shapes of the appropriate dimensions. One could then argue that if these shapes 
are presumed not to be inter-penetrable, then the peg shape could not be posi-
tioned within the hole shape. One would then describe how such shapes could be 
filled with quantum material so that they become non-inter-penetrable, i.e., solids. 
But in doing so, isn‟t one again showing how one could use the quantum level to  
implement pegs and holes and then making a geometrical argument? 
It seems to me that any argument showing that a peg and hole of incompatible 
sizes cannot fit one within the other must be made at the geometrical level and that 
when one starts at the quantum level, one finds oneself describing how to imple-
ment the level of geometrical solids and then making the argument at the geome-
trical level. Perhaps the problem is that one simply cannot talk about pegs and 
holes in any language other than at the level of geometrical abstractions. 
9. Levels of abstraction and multiple realizability  
The peg-and-hole and similar examples are frequently used to argue the functio-
nalist position that multiply realizable properties are not reducible: if there are 
multiple realizations, to which one is the higher level property reducible? I believe 
that this argument misses the point. A level of abstraction, like a Turing machine, 
exists at the abstraction level because it is independently specifiable—not because 
it is multiply realizable, e.g., as a Game-of-Life and as a Turing machine imple-
mented on some other platform. The abstraction exists as an abstraction whether 
or not it is realized. Similarly a level of abstraction with only one implementation 
is just as real an abstraction as one with multiple realizations.  
How are abstractions related to what actually exists in the world? The perspec-
tive I favor turns the question of realizability around. In exploring what actually 
exists the question is not whether any particular abstraction is multiply realizable. 
The question becomes what new levels of abstraction can one implement given the 
currently existing levels of abstraction? Does it really matter, for example, wheth-
er eyes or wings evolved once or multiple times? What really matters is that each 
time they evolved they enabled its possessors to see or fly. The fact (if it is a fact) 
that vision and flight are more or less the same in each case is not important. What 
is important is that a vision/flight capability was created, whether that happened 
once or many times. The ontological status of higher levels of abstraction should 
not be dependent on how often those abstractions have been realized.  
The preceding is not intended to deny that levels of abstraction can be imple-
mented in multiple ways. One of the fundamental tenants in my own field of com-
puter science is the importance of distinguishing between a specification and an 
implementation. It is the specification that determines how something can be ex-
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pected to behave. It doesn‟t matter how that specification is implemented as long 
as the implementation realizes the specification.  There can be multiple ways to 
implement a specification. So it is certainly possible for a level of abstraction, i.e., 
a specification, to have multiple implementations. But it is not the multiple im-
plementations that make the specification independent of the implementation. It is 
the specification itself, the fact that it can be expressed without relying on the im-
plementation as part of the description that makes it independent.  
Specifications typically occur in the context of man-made artifacts. Nature nei-
ther writes nor implements specifications. But nature does provide environments 
that are more manageable when entities have certain features and capabilities. In 
that sense one can think of nature as providing specifications: the environment that 
must be navigated. Since vision and flight are useful capabilities, the ability to fo-
cus and to extract information from light and the ability to suspend oneself and 
propel oneself though the air can be understood as specifications for vision and 
flight capabilities. Those “specifications” may each have been implemented 
once—with a number of variations, or they may each have been implemented 
multiple times—resulting in a number of similar capabilities in different organ-
isms. Once or many times doesn‟t matter; it‟s the ability to see or to fly that mat-
ters.  
10. Entities  
Although it hasn‟t been raised explicitly, central to this discussion is the issue of 
entities.  Are there higher level entities? What is the ontological status of instances 
of levels of abstraction? This section discusses these questions.  
 In this article I‟m considering only material entities. Other entity-like elements 
such as time instants and durations, geometric regions, numbers, etc. are beyond 
the scope of this discussion. Provisionally I‟ll define an entity as a persistent pat-
tern. Since a pattern implies increased organization, an entity is an area of reduced 
entropy.  
I wish I could think of a better word than “area.” But I have not been able to 
come up with a category of which entity is a subcategory. Perhaps that means that 
entity is itself a level of abstraction. This is consistent with the software world. In 
many object-oriented programming languages, the most general type is an undiffe-
rentiated “object.” Object is a primitive of the language; it is not defined in terms 
of anything else. So perhaps we should take entities as primitive and simply note 
that we identify them because they persist and have reduced entropy. 
Reduced entropy implies energy. So entities must be related to energy. Table 1 
presents a categorization of entities according to two characteristics: energy and 
whether they are naturally occurring or man-made.  
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Table 1. Categories of entities 
 Naturally occurring Human designed 
E
n
er
g
y 
S
ta
tu
s 
Static. At an energy equili-
brium; in an “energy well.” 
Supervenience is useful. 
Atoms, molecules, 
solar systems, … 
Tables, boats, hous-
es, cars, ships,  … 
Dynamic. Must import 
energy (and usually other 
resources) to persist. Su-
pervenience is not useful. 
Hurricanes(!), bio-
logical organisms, 
biological groups, 
… 
Social groups such 
as governments, 
corporations, clubs, 
the ship of The-
seus(!), … 
Subsidized. Energy is not 
relevant since it is provided 
“for free” within a “labora-
tory” which has built-in 
support for entities. 
Ideas, concepts, 
“memes,” … The 
elements of a con-
ceptual system. 
(This paper is not 
about consciousness. 
This category just 
fits here.) 
The “first class” 
values—such as ob-
jects, classes, class 
instances, etc.—
within a computa-
tional system. 
 
Static entities. These are entities that exist in an energy well. Examples include 
atoms (made from elementary particles), molecules (made from atoms), solids 
(made from atoms and molecules), etc. As an instance of a level of abstraction an 
entity is the product of constraints. In this case, the constraints are the fundamental 
forces that hold components together. Phase transitions typically mark the imposi-
tion or removal of constraints of this sort. The forces that create static entities pro-
duce energy wells; energy is required to break them apart. Consequently a static 
entity comprises less mass as an entity than its components taken separately. Since 
the components of a static entity tend to remain identifiable as part of the entity, 
supervenience tends to be useful. Static entities supervene over their components. 
Naturally occurring static entities are those familiar to us from physics, chemistry, 
and the other “hard” sciences. Most human designed objects are also static enti-
ties.  
Dynamic entities. These are entities in which components are tied together by 
procedural processes. Examples include biological organisms (naturally occurring) 
and social groups (man-made). A biological organism persists as long as its com-
ponents interact in just the right ways. Similarly, the processes of a social group, 
i.e., the ways in which the group members behave and interact, cause the group to 
persist as a group. To take a very simple example a social club—a bridge club, a 
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bowling club, etc.—is held together by the fact that the members adhere to (formal 
or informal) agreements about how they will behave.  
Dynamic entities have the interesting property that their components may 
change while the entity itself persists. People may join and leave a club even 
though the club persists. One is a member of the club as long as one behaves ac-
cording to the processes that define the club. Those old enough to remember Guys 
and Dolls may recall “the oldest established permanent floating crap game in New 
York.” The same sort of analysis applies to animal groups like herds, colonies, etc. 
Similarly, biological organisms gain and lose molecules while they persist as or-
ganisms. This feature makes dynamic entities less amenable to analysis by super-
venience. A dynamic entity typically does not supervene over the collection of 
components that make it up at any one time. 
Wilson [19] makes the point that virtually everything in the social and biologi-
cal realm is both a group and an entity. That echoes from an evolutionary perspec-
tive the point made in this paper, that entities at a level of abstraction must be un-
derstood in terms of their behavior at that level even though they also understood 
as being implemented by elements from lower levels. 
In another contrast to static entities (which require energy to tear them apart) 
dynamic entities require energy to keep themselves together. They cohere—the 
dynamic entity persists—only so long as their components behave according to 
the rules that define how they should behave. Such behavior requires energy. Con-
sequently, dynamic entities must import energy from their environments to persist. 
Because dynamic entities involve components in action, they comprise more mass 
(the components along with their energy of action) than their components sepa-
rately. 
Symbolic entities. A symbolic framework provides the means to create new 
abstractions. Entities created within such a framework are (appropriately) called 
symbolic entities. Examples are the entities created within computational frame-
works such as the Game of Life and computer programming languages and envi-
ronments. In symbolic frameworks, mechanisms exist to support the creation of 
new abstractions. No special energy is required as long as the framework itself 
continues to exist. Although the framework itself must have energy supplied to it, 
the individual entities are not strongly tied to energy. Presumably a similar me-
chanism (the symbolic framework that operates within our consciousness) enables 
us to conceptualize symbolic entities. 
Static and dynamic entities are distinguishable by mass: static entities have less 
mass and dynamic entities have more mass than the mass of their components tak-
en separately. All three classes of entities are distinguished by their entropy. They 
all have less entropy then their surroundings—and their components are more 
highly correlated with each other (a) than with outside elements and (b) than out-
side elements are with each other. Because of these objectively observable proper-
ties, entities are part of nature‟s ontology, i.e., they are objectively real.  
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Furthermore, even though most if not all of these entities can be reduced to 
their components—one can describe in detail how their components fit together to 
produce the entity—they interact with their environment, including other entities, 
as entities. Nations go to war with each other; biological organisms breed; ships 
float and carry passengers and freight; etc. The descriptions of how entities inte-
ract as entities define their levels of abstraction. To reduce away those interactions 
is to deny the reality of the interacting entities.  
11. Summary  
The need to understand and describe complex systems led computer scientists to 
develop concepts that clarify issues beyond computer science. In particular, the 
notion of the level of abstraction and its implementation by pre-existing levels of 
abstraction explains how higher level laws of nature help govern a reductionist un-
iverse.  
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(Sidebar) Mathematics, science, and engineering (including 
computer science)  
The notion of the level of abstraction clarifies some of the similarities and differ-
ences among mathematics, science, engineering, and computer science.  
Mathematics is the study of the entities and operations defined on various le-
vels of abstraction—whether or not those levels of abstraction are implemented. 
Mathematicians devise formal (or at least “rigorous”) specifications of levels of 
abstraction. They then study the consequences of those specifications—which in 
the case of Peano‟s axioms is number theory.  
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Science is (a) the characterization of observed natural phenomena as levels of 
abstraction, i.e., the framing of observed phenomena as patterns, followed by (b) a 
determination of how those levels of abstraction are implemented by lower level 
mechanisms. 
Engineering (including computer science) is the imagination and implementa-
tion of new levels of abstraction. The levels of abstraction that engineers and 
computer scientists implement are almost always defined informally—most real-
world systems are too complex to specify formally. They are often characterized 
in terms of what are called requirements, natural language descriptions of required 
functional and performance properties. Engineers and computer scientists imple-
ment systems that meet requirements. 
Whereas engineers and computer scientists imagine and implement new levels 
of abstraction, scientists identify existing levels of abstraction and discover the 
mechanisms nature uses to implement them. In other words, science is the reverse 
engineering of nature. 
Why did computer science rather than engineering develop the notion of level 
of abstraction? In [21] I discuss how computer scientists start from a well defined 
base level of abstraction—the bit and the logical operations defined on it—and 
build new levels of abstraction upwards from that base. Engineers work with 
physical objects implemented at multiple and arbitrary levels of abstraction. Since 
there is no engineering base level of abstraction, engineers construct mathematical 
models that approximate nature as far down as necessary to ensure that the sys-
tems they build have reliable physical foundations.  Engineers are often pre-
occupied with approximating downward. Given the (paradoxically solid) founda-
tion of the bit, computer scientists have more freedom to imagine upward. 
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Appendix. Dennett’s “Real Patterns” 
In “Real Patterns” Dennett (1991) uses the fact that a Turing Machine may be im-
plemented in terms of Game-of-Life patterns to argue for his The Intentional 
Stance (1987) position regarding beliefs—which he calls mild realism. 
It has been suggested that “Real Patterns” has a significant overlap with this 
paper. I disagree. But to explore that issue, this appendix examines “Real Pat-
terns” in some depth. My primary goal is to describe (in Dennett‟s own words as 
much as possible) the primary points made in “Real Patterns.” 
The fundamental issue discussed in “Real Patterns” is the status of beliefs. 
Much of the paper draws connections among beliefs, patterns, and predictions. 
Here‟s an extract which is represented as the paper‟s core content. It appears (as of 
July 1, 2008) on the Tufts Cognitive Study website: 
http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/realpatt.htm. 
Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, 
presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a 
superseded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as 
admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such 
state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either 
be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing 
conviction prevails, then, to the effect that when it comes to beliefs (and other mental 
items) one must be either a realist or an eliminative materialist. 
Dennett suggests that one way to evaluate a belief is by looking at predictions 
they allow one to make. He writes (p. 30) that “the success of any prediction de-
pends on there being some order or pattern in the world to exploit. What is the pat-
tern a pattern of?” 
Thus, Dennett acknowledges—unsurprisingly—that there are regularities in the 
world, which he tends to call patterns. Dennett does not seem to be asking how 
those regularities come about or what they consist of. He seems more interested in 
the relationship between such regularities and how we think about them. Dennett 
continues (p. 30).  
Some have thought, with Fodor, that the pattern of belief must in the end be a pattern of 
structures in the brain, formulae written in the language of thought.  Where else could it 
be? Gibsonians might say the pattern is “in the light”—and Quinians (such as Donald 
Davidson and I) could almost agree: the pattern is discernible in agents‟ (observable) 
behavior when we subject it to “radical interpretation” (Davidson) “from the intentional 
stance” (Dennett). 
When are the elements of a pattern real and not merely apparent? Answering this question 
will help us resolve the misconceptions that have led to the proliferation of “ontological 
positions” about beliefs, the different grades or kinds of realism. I shall concentrate on 
five salient exemplars arrayed in the space of possibilities: Fodor‟s industrial strength 
Realism …; Dadvidson‟s regular strength realism; my mild realism; Richard Rorty‟s 
milder-than-mild irrealism, according to which the pattern is only in the eyes of the 
beholders, and Paul Churchland‟s eliminative materialism, which denies the reality of 
beliefs altogether.”.  
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Earlier (p. 29) he writes, 
I have claimed that beliefs are best considered to be abstract objects rather like centers of 
gravity. … My aim [in this paper] is not so much to prove that my intermediate doctrine 
about the reality of psychological states is right, but just that it is quite possibly right … .” 
His concern, he says (p. 30), is 
not in differences of opinion about the ultimate metaphysical status of physical things or 
abstract things (e.g., electrons or centers of gravity), but in differences of opinion about 
whether beliefs and other mental states are, shall we say, as real as electrons or centers of 
gravity. I want to show that mild realism is the doctrine that makes the most sense when 
what we are talking about are real patterns, such as the real patterns discernible from the 
intentional stance. 
Although earlier Dennett acknowledged that there are regularities (patterns) in 
nature, it is not clear from the final sentence in the preceding whether Dennett is 
now claiming that at least some of these patterns become apparent only when one 
takes the intentional stance. 
In contrast to what seems like philosophical infighting, my concern is not with 
the ontological status of beliefs but with what I claim are real features of nature—
whether anyone has beliefs about them or not.  
Dennett cites an article by Chaitin that discusses Chaitin‟s measure of random-
ness and says that a pattern is real “if there is a description of the data that is more 
efficient than the bit map,” i.e., more concise than a literal replication of the primi-
tive elements of which the pattern is composed.  
Yet this discussion about patterns and their efficient representation seems to be 
diluted by Dennett‟s more general acknowledgement (p. 36) that science is “wide-
ly acknowledged as the final arbiter of ontology. Science is supposed to carve na-
ture at the joints—at the real joints, of course.” 
If that is the case, then to determine what is real, ask a scientist—or at least an 
expert in the field—who presumably has a more efficient (or more insightful?) 
way of describing data than an exhaustive enumeration.  
And that is more or less the position that Dennett takes. Dennett then refers 
(p. 41) to the fact that a Turing machine can be built using Game-of-Life patterns.  
Since the universal Turing machine can compute any computable function, it can play 
chess—simply by mimicking the program of any chess-playing computer you like. … 
Looking at the configuration of dots that accomplishes this marvel would almost certainly 
be unilluminating to anyone who had no clue that a configuration with such powers could 
exist. But from the perspective of one who had the hypothesis that this huge array of 
black dots was a chess-playing computer, enormously efficient ways of predicting the 
future of that configuration are made available.  … 
The scale of compression when one adopts the intentional stance toward the two-
dimensional chess-playing computer galaxy is stupendous: it is the difference between 
figuring out in your head what white‟s most likely (best) move is versus calculating the 
state of a few trillion pixels through a few hundred thousand generations. But the scale of 
the savings is really no greater in the Life world than in our own Predicting that someone 
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will duck if you throw a brick at him is easy from the folk-psychological stance; it is and 
will always be intractable if you have to trace the photons from brick to eyeball, the 
neurotransmitters from optic nerve to motor nerve, and so forth. 
Dennett moves on from this observation to discuss Fodor‟s position with re-
spect to regularities and whether or not they must be mirrored in the brain. (p. 42) 
For Fodor, … beliefs and their kin would not be real unless the pattern dimly discernible 
from the perspective of folk psychology could also be discerned (more clearly, with less 
noise) as a pattern of structures  in the brain. 
Dennett then returns (p. 43) to discussing regularities in the world. He claims 
that  
Philosophers have tended to ignore a variety of regularity intermediate between the 
regularities of planets and other objects “obeying” the laws of physics and the regularities 
of rule-following (that is rule-consulting) systems. These intermediate regularities are 
those which are preserved under selection pressure: the regularities dictated by principles 
of good design and hence homed in on any self-designing systems. That is, a “rule of 
thought” may be much more than a mere regularity; it may be a wise rule, a rule one 
would design a system by if one were a system designer … . Such rules no more need to 
be explicitly represented than do the principles of aerodynamics that are honored in the 
design of birds‟ wings. 
It isn‟t clear to me to which regularities Dennett is referring.  Is he really saying 
that regularities that have been discovered by evolution (or those common to engi-
neering or creative design) have been ignored by philosophers? It doesn‟t seem to 
matter, though, because Dennett doesn‟t discuss these regularities either.   
Dennett then returns to relationships between individuals‟ beliefs, the predic-
tions they may make about the world, and the generally noisy patterns on which 
those beliefs and predictions are based. (p. 45) 
Fodor takes beliefs to be things in the head—just like cells and blood vessels and viruses. 
… Churchland [with whom Dennett agrees on this point favors understanding beliefs as] 
indirect “measurements” of a reality diffused in the behavioral dispositions of the brain 
(and body). We think beliefs are real enough to call real just so long as belief talk 
measures these complex behavior-disposing organs as predictively as it does.  
Much of the rest of the paper is devoted to arguing that two individuals may 
see two different patterns in the same data and that (p. 48) “such radical indeter-
minacy is a genuine and stable possibility.” 
Dennett allows (p. 49) for the possibility of correctly deciding which of two 
such competing positions is “correct” by dropping “down from the intentional 
stance to the design or physical stances.” On the other hand, (p. 49) he says that 
there could be two different systems of belief attribution to an individual which differed 
substantially in what they attributed—even yielding substantially different predictions of 
the individual‟s future behavior—and yet where no deeper fact of the matter could 
establish that one was a description of the individual‟s real beliefs and the other not. In 
other words, there could be two different, but equally real, patterns discernible in the 
noisy world. The rival theorists would not even agree on which parts of the world were 
pattern and which were noise, and yet nothing deeper would settle the issue. The choice 
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of a pattern would indeed be up to the observer, a matter to be decided on idiosyncratic 
pragmatic grounds.  
Dennett ends (p. 51) with the following. 
A truly general-purpose, robust system of pattern description more valuable than the 
intentional stance is not an impossibility, but anyone who wants to bet on it might care to 
talk to me about the odds they will take. 
What does all this show? Not that Fodor‟s industrial-strength Realism must be false, and 
not that Churchland‟s eliminative materialism must be false, but just that both views are 
gratuitously strong forms of materialism—presumptive theses way out in front of the 
empirical support they require. Rorty‟s view errs in the opposite direction, ignoring the 
impressive empirical track record that distinguishes the intentional stance from the 
astrological stance. Davidson‟s intermediate position, like mine, ties reality to the brute 
existence of pattern, but Davidson has overlooked the possibility of two or more 
conflicting patterns being superimposed on the same data—a more radical indeterminacy 
of translation than he had supposed possible. Now, once again, is the view that I am 
defending here a sort of instrumentalism or a sort of realism? I think that the view itself is 
clearer than either of these labels, so I shall leave that question to anyone who still finds 
illumination in them. 
It seems clear that although Dennett must approach some of the issues that 
arise when exploring questions of reductionism and emergence and that he makes 
use of the fact that it is possible to emulate a Turing Machine by using Game-of-
Life patterns, the focus of “Real patterns” is to offer guidance to philosophers re-
garding how his views about beliefs are positioned relative to those of other philo-
sophers and not to discuss issues of reductionism, emergence, levels of abstrac-
tion, or the reality of higher level entities. 
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